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strength wars. The Court acknowledged the "overall
irrationality" of the current label regulation in light of
the more effective, and unchallenged, advertising
regulation. The Court found Coors' argument persuasive, which focused on the different treatment of alcohol
disclosure in malt liquor.
As the Court recognized, even though the
regulation advanced the state's interest in a "direct and
material way," it failed the First Amendment test that
required a "fit" between the regulation and its articulated
goals. Alternatives exist which accomplish the
government's goals more effectively. For example,
Coors suggested directly limiting the alcohol content of
beer or limiting the ban to "malt liquor." The Court
recognized that the label ban was too broad and concluded that it violated the First Amendment's protections
of commercial speech. Therefore, the Court invalidated
the label ban and affirmed the Tenth Circuit's opinion.

Justice Stevens disagrees with analysis
Justice Stevens, concurring, disagreed that beer
labels qualify as commercial speech because the label

regulation does not prevent misleading speech or protect
consumers from incomplete information - the essential
reasons for regulating commercial speech.
Justice Stevens based his position on Coors'
desire to disclose truthful, accurate information about
the alcohol content of its beer. Justice Stevens argued
that the majority failed to articulate why the lower
protection standards afforded commercial speech should
apply to beer labels. In any other context, truthful
statements about alcohol content would receive full First
Amendment protection. Justice Stevens reasoned that
commercial speech guidelines should be limited to
speech that may mislead consumers. Here, Coors merely
wished to present "truthful, unadorned, informative
speech." Therefore, Justice Stevens argued the higher
protections given to speech under general First Amendment guidelines should have applied to nullify the label
ban.
Nevertheless, the majority's position that
commercial speech guidelines govern led to the invalidation of the federal label ban on alcohol content
disclosure on beer labels in those states that do not
mandate it themselves.

Texas Supreme Court denies homeowners' implied
warranty and unconscionability claims under
state's Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act
by Raquel Villanueva
In Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434
(Tex. 1994), the Supreme Court of Texas held that
homeowners suing their developer under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
("DTPA") had no cause of action based upon either an
implied warranty or unconscionability theory. The court
further held that the lower court's judgment allowing the

14 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

homeowners to recover both the cost of repairs and the
diminution in value of the home improperly granted
them double recovery and ruled that the homeowners
failed to evidence compensable mental anguish. Therefore, the court modified the judgment by denying double
recovery and damages for DPTA claims and attorneys'
fees.
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Homeowners sue developer under state
consumer protection act
In 1981, Ray and Constance Woodruff (the
"Woodruffs") purchased a home in a real estate development known as Sugar Creek. The house had two
previous owners and had been built and originally sold
by Harrington Homes ("Harrington"). The real estate
developer, Parkway Company ("Parkway"), prepared
the land upon which the house was built by platting,
surveying, regrading, building roads, and dealing with
local regulatory and utility authorities. In 1983, Parkway
began to develop Section 34 of Sugar Creek, which was
located immediately east of the Woodruffs' lot and a
commercial tract of land known as the Kaneb tract,
which lay directly north of the Woodruffs' property.
Parkway then began constructing a wall along the line
which divided Section 34 from the Woodruffs' land and
the Kaneb tract.
During the construction of the wall, Ray
Woodruff wrote a letter to Parkway objecting to the
erection of the wall and informing the developer that the
wall might alter drainage patterns on his lot. The
construction, however, continued. After a heavy storm,
the Woodruffs noticed that regrading activity on the new
development diverted runoff from the Kaneb tract onto
their land. Although Parkway's engineers proposed a
new drainage system, Woodruff objected and installed
another type of drainage system. Parkway then offered
to pay for the drainage system if Woodruff released it
from any future liability. However, Woodruff rejected
the offer and covered the costs himself.
After Parkway completed the wall, run off from
the Kaneb tract flooded the Woodruffs' house on three
occasions resulting in structural damage to their home.
The Woodruffs then sued Parkway for negligence, gross
negligence, nuisance, trespass, and Water Code violations. The Woodruffs also alleged that Parkway violated
the DTPA by: 1) acting unconscionably; 2) engaging in
false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices; and 3)
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knowingly breaching an implied warranty to perform
developmental services in a good and workmanlike
manner. The Woodruffs subsequently amended their
complaint suing the engineers, the owners of the Kaneb
tract, and Harrington.

Jury renders judgment for homeowners
The trial court granted a directed verdict for
Harrington and Parkway's engineers and the jury did not
find the owners of the Kaneb tract negligent. The jury,
however, found Parkway negligent and in violation of
the Water Code, that Parkway knowingly breached an
implied warranty, and that it acted unconscionably. Yet
the jury failed to find that Parkway was grossly negligent, that it had engaged in any false, misleading, or
deceptive acts or practices, or that it had intentionally
caused a trespass of the plaintiff's property. The court
entered a judgment for actual damages of $220,000:
$120,000 for diminution in value, and $100,000 for
house repairs. The court further rendered judgment for
additional damages, attorneys' fees, and mental anguish.
In the ensuing appeal, the Houston First Judicial District
Court of Appeals affirmed most of the district court's
judgment but denied recovery for mental anguish and
added $14,000 to the judgment for the Woodruffs' outof-pocket expenses. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Texas, Parkway asserted that it did not violate the DTPA
by either breaching an implied warranty or acting
unconscionably. Furthermore, Parkway asserted that the
homeowners had received a double recovery although
they failed to establish compensable mental anguish.

Court denies recovery under DTPA action
The Supreme Court of Texas held that Parkway
did not violate the DTPA by breaching an implied
warranty to perform future developmental services in a
good and workmanlike manner. Although the DTPA
prohibits the breach of an express and implied warranty,

Recent Cases 9 15

it does not create warranties. Any actionable warranties
under the DTPA must be recognized under the common
law or by statute. The court first considered whether an
implied warranty was recognizable where service, rather
than sales transactions, were involved and found that
common law creates an implied service warranty. In
support of this finding, the court cited Melody Homes v.
Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), which
recognized an implied warranty to repair or modify
existing tangible goods or property in a good and
workmanlike manner, but which also limited the judicial
imposition of the warranty to situations where there is a
demonstrated need. Melody Homes also limits the
implied warranty "to services provided to remedy
defects existing at the time of the relevant consumer
transaction."
Applying these principals, the court then
decided whether consumers who are injured by substandard service may recover under an implied warranty
theory, even if they neither sought nor acquired the
service about which they complain. The Woodruffs'
claim depended upon whether future developmental
services were promised as part of the initial transaction
between Harrington and Parkway. The Woodruffs
claimed that future developmental services were
promised under the "master planned community," and
the court of appeals interpreted a "master planned
community" as an implied promise to never adversely
affect any homeowner in the community. The Woodruffs
also argued that the scale model of the community
represented an express warranty of future developmental
services. However, the supreme court rejected the
Woodruffs's expansive interpretation of "master planned
community" and found that Parkway did not use that
term to form an implied promise to provide future
services; rather, "master planned community" indicated
that homeowners had a common interest in ownership in
Sugar Creek. Since the transaction did not involve
services, Parkway did not breach a service-related
warranty and therefore no implied warranty to perform
future developmental services existed. In response to the

16 a Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Woodruffs' scale model argument, the court ruled that
the model only represented where the homes were going
to be within the community, not an express warranty.
The court also rejected the Woodruffs' alternative DTPA claim that Parkway acted unconscionably.
The DTPA defines an "unconscionable action" as one
which "takes advantage of the lack of knowledge or
capacity of a person to a grossly unfair degree." An act
may also be considered unconscionable if it "results in a
gross disparity between the value received and the
consideration paid in a transaction involving transfer of
consideration." The Woodruffs asserted that Parkway
maintained exclusive control over the drainage on the
adjacent lots, which deprived them of their "ability or
capacity" to protect their interests. They further asserted
that the diminution in the value of their home constituted
an unconscionable act because the flooding created a
gross disparity between the value and consideration paid
for the home. Parkway countered that the homeowners
failed to show evidence that Parkway either took
advantage of its special skills and training or caused a
gross disparity in value at the time of the sale. The court
agreed with Parkway, concluding that the Woodruffs
failed to support their claim of unconscionability.
Therefore, the court reformed the judgment, excluding
damages based upon the DTPA and attorneys' fees.

Court denies homeowners double recovery
The court supported Parkway's contention that
the court of appeals granted a double recovery, which
Texas law prohibits. The court of appeals erroneously
awarded the Woodruffs both the cost of repairs and the
diminution in the value of the home. Since the diminution in value was calculated based on the assumption
that they had made no repairs rather than on a comparison of the original value of the property and the value
after they made repairs, the Woodruffs effectively
recovered twice.
Texas law requires that the Woodruffs choose
between the two alternative measures of damages: 1) the

Volume 8, number I

diminution in market value of the house; or 2) the cost
of repairs. If the prevailing party fails to choose among
alternatives, the court should render the judgment
affording the greatest recovery. Therefore, the court
reduced the judgment for actual damages by $100,000.

Court holds that anger and frustration are
not compensable
The Woodruffs appealed the deletion of the
award for mental anguish, but they failed to present
direct evidence at trial regarding the nature, duration,

and severity of this anguish. Thus, the court applied the
traditional "no evidence" standard to decide whether the
record supported a finding of a "high degree of mental
pain and distress" which could be compensable. The
supreme court found no direct evidence on the record
establishing that the Woodruffs suffered mental anguish
resulting from the flooding and therefore denied
recovery. In affirming and modifying the court of
appeals' judgment, the court ruled that the Woodruffs'
anger and frustration did not rise to a level of
compensable mental anguish and deleted damages for
DTPA claims, the Woodruff's attorneys' fees, and
double recovery.

Use of standard form does not preclude TILA
violation
by Jane Cady
In Shields v. Lefta, 888
ESupp. 894 (N.D. Hll. 1995), the
United State District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois ruled on
a class action suit alleging violations
of the Federal Truth In Lending Act
("TILA"). In ruling on the
defendant's motion to dismiss, the
court held that the defendant's use of
the Federal Reserve Board's model
disclosure form did not preclude it
from violating the TILA. Furthermore, the court held that the
placement of the service contract
price among nonnegotiable items
did not violate the TILA or the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deception Act ("CFA"). Therefore,
the defendant's motion to dismiss
was denied in part and granted in
part.
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TILA requires creditors to
disclose financial
information
The purpose of the TILA is
to provide meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so consumers may
compare available credit terms; to
avoid the uninformed use of credit;
and to protect consumers against
inaccurate and unfair credit billing.
To achieve these goals, Congress
granted the Federal Reserve Board
authority to expand the legal
framework governing commerce in
credit by promulgating Regulation
Z. Regulation Z requires a creditor
to disclose certain information for
each transaction conducted. A
creditor must separately itemize the

amount a consumer finances for
each transaction and also identify
any other person it pays on behalf of
the consumer.
In this case, each class
member purchased a car from the
defendant , Lefta, Inc., and financed
the transaction through a motor
vehicle installment sales contract.
Each car buyer also purchased an
extended warranty or service
contract from the defendant. The
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant
inadequately revealed the costs
included in the installment sales
contract for two reasons. First, the
defendant listed the entire amount
charged to the plaintiffs for a
purchased service contract under the
category "Amount Paid to Others."
Second, the defendant placed the
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